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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
C ~-\.'rH_._-\.RIN".b~ S. GIBBONS, 
Plaint-iff and ~.fppellant 
-YS-
BYRON BRI~I~I~ and 'v-ife 
HILD~\ ~\, BRIJ\L~I, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 7596 
... ~PPELLANT 'S 
BRIEF 
ST_A_TEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, a \vidow, prior to the year 1936, had 
been regularly employed at Lynn Brother's hospital, 
at Pocatello, Idaho, as a registered nurse. Due to her 
mother's illness, plaintiff can1e hon1e to nurse and care 
for her until her death in 1938. Her brother M. L. An-
derson, a bachelor, was also living at the home taking 
care of the farm, and after their mother's death they 
continued to live together until his sudden death in 
October, 1947. (Tr. 151) Plaintiff's health was poorly 
at the time of his death and she required some one to 
live with her during periods of sickness. Plaintiff's 
brother, George L. Anderson and his wife, came from 
California to attend the funeral of M. L. Anderson, and 
re1nained with the plaintiff fro1n October, 1947, until 
about June 1, 1948, when they left and returned to Cal-
ifornia. George had planted crops of sugar beets and 
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2 
grain on the farm land hereinafter mentioned prior to 
his departure. (Tr. 116) Plaintiff was then 75 years of 
age, sickly and infirm and was in need of SOllleone to live 
V\7itl1, care for, and nurse her. 
Plaintiff was then the owner of an eight-ninths un-
divided interest in the real property described in the 
co1nplaint, consisting of 20 acres of irrigated farm land, 
87 acres of grazing land and about 2 lots of town prop-
erty, with a home, barn, garage, and granary situated 
thereon, and two cows, farm implements and household 
furniture. Plaintiff's interest in said property was of 
the admitted value of $10,600.00, and it was unencum-
bered. (Tr. 387, 388) Plaintiff's brother, John C. An-
derson, was the owner of the other one-ninth interest 
In . the real property. 
The defendants are husband and wife, having inter-
married on December 23, 1947. Tr. 115, 222) Defend-
ant Hilda A. Brimm is plaintiff's niece, and on June 
· 1, 1948, they resided in Ogden, Utah. The defendant 
Byron Brimm was then unemployed, (Tr. 456) and de-
fendant Hilda Brimm had just completed teaching school 
in Ogden, for the current school term. (Tr. 77, 80) At 
plaintiff's request the defendants carne to 1\{endon, a--
. bout June 8, 1948, and began to live with and care for 
plaintiff, and also cultivated and cared for the crops. 
(Tr. 79, 80) . 
The plaintiff and defendants lived together during 
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the sununer of 1948, and about September 1st, liilda 
1noved back to Ogden, to teach school, taking the plain-
tiff \Yith her. ('11 r. 80) Byron harvested the crops, 
and usually he \\·ent to Ogden on weekends, to visit 
Hilda and the plaintiff. (Tr. 81) Between Thanks-
giving tiine and ('ihrist1nas, 1948, plaintiff had trouble 
\Yith her heart. She \\·as confined in the Dee Hospital 
fron1 Decen1ber 17th to the 29th, 1948. (Tr. 81, 236) 
During this period of time defendant Brim1n was visit-
ing relatives in :Jiinnesota. He returned during the 
first part of January, 1949. (Tr. 82) 
On January 23, 1949, the defendants induced the 
plaintiff to convey to defendant Hilda Brimm the eight-
ninths undivided interest in the real property above 
1nentioned, in consideration of their agreement to live 
\Yith plaintiff, care for, and nurse her in sickness, and 
treat her \vith due respect and affection, maintain and 
support her for and during the remainder of her natural 
life and pay for her medical, doctor and burial expenses. 
(Tr. 83, 84) The deed and bill of sale were prepared by 
Attorney D. R. Dickens, of Ogden, at the defendant's 
request. (Tr. 184) The plaintiff relied upon the defend-
ant's promise and agreement at the time she executed 
the deed, (PI's Ex "Q", Tr. 84), and that no other 
consideration passed between plaintiff and defendants 
for the conveyance of said property. (Tr. 83) That at 
the same time and without plaintiff's knowledge, and 
without consideration, save the foregoing agreement, de-
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4 
fendants procured plaintiff's signature to a bill of sale 
(Pl's Ex. "U") transfering to defendant Hilda Brimm 
the household furniture, farm implements and two cows. 
(Tr. 201) 
The parties resided at Ogden, until the end of school, 
about June 1, 1949, when they moved to Mendon for the 
summer. Defendant Bryon Brimm had returned to 
l\lendon earlier to plant the crops. 
About June 22, 1949, plaintiff's brother John An-
derson, for a cash consideration of $2,000.00, conveyed 
the remaining one-ninth undivided interest in said prop-
erty to Hilda Brimm. (Tr. 86) This money was provided 
by the plaintiff. (Tr. 87) There was no consideration 
passed from Hilda to the plaintiff, except the services 
to be rendered under the previous agree1nent of January 
25, 1949, by the defendants to plaintiff. (Tr. 112) 
During the month of July, 1949, and after the de-
fendant Hilda Brimm had acquired title to all of plain-
tiff's property, real and personal, of the admitted value 
of $16,600.00, defendant Byron Brimm began to manifest 
to,vards plaintiff an arrogant and overbearing attitude. 
He refused to eat with or otherwise associate with her, 
and failed to sho"r any solicitation or concern for plain-
tiff's welfare. (Tr. 98) And during the fall of 1949, he 
refused to call at the apartment in Ogden or associate 
with her in any manner. (Tr. 90) The defendants spent 
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5 
the \Yeekends in :Jiendon, during this tilne, often leaving 
plaintiff alone at Ogden, ( Tr. 91) 
The defendants left for l\1innesota a few days prior 
to Dece1nber 25, 19-!9, leaving plaintiff with her sister, 
l\lrs. Bruce Pett. (Tr. 92) Hilda 'returned about Jan nary 
1, 1950, to resun1e her school work. (Tr. 92) Hilda didn't 
sho\v 1nuch interest in plaintiff after her return froin 
1\'Iinnesota in January, 1950. The fact that Byron re-
fused to liye 'vith plaintiff was manifesting itself 
through Hilda's indifference towards plaintiff. (Tr. 92) 
She told plaintiff that it was causing a separation be-
t,veen then1 because Byron refused to live in the apart-
nlent as long as plaintiff remained there. (Tr. 93) Dur-
ing the winter of 1949-50, Hilda left plaintiff alone in 
the apart1nent during the day time. (Tr. 94, 147, 149) 
Hilda also physically abused plaintiff (Tr. 93, 95, 168, 
177' 211, 212, 214) 
Byron Brinnn returned from Minnesota about Feb-
ruary 10, 1950, and registered at the Earl Hotel at 
Ogden. (Tr. 363) About 5 o'clock p.m. he called Hilda 
on the phone, and she left the apartment to meet hin1, 
and returned to the apartment alone later in the evening·. 
(Tr. 96) On Sunday, February 12, 1950, plaintiff decided 
to leave the apartment and return to her ho1ne in Men·-
don, and was taken there by Mr. and Mrs. Robbins. 
(Tr. 96, 97) Later the same day Hilda and Attorney 
Dickens went to Mendon and brought plaintiff back to 
Ogden, (Tr. 97) and upon their arrival there, plaintiff 
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6 
told Hilda that she didn't want to live with her any. 
longer, under the circumstances as they there existed. 
(Tr. 98) 
A few days before February 13, 1950, plaintiff 
asked Hilda to deed the property back to her, and Hilda 
said that "Byron wouldn't let me do that." (Tr. 166) 
Plaintiff testified, that during the fall and winter of 
1949, and 1950, defendant Hilda Brimm left her alone, 
and when she came home from school Hilda was cross 
and irritable towards plaintiff. (Tr. 167) During the 
sa1ne period of time plaintiff testified that Hilda had 
shaken her a few times; that Hilda would shake· her 
and sit her down in a chair or a sofa. Plaintiff be-
came very nervous and it made her feel as though she 
'vasn't wanted there. (Tr. 168) Hilda refused to permit 
any friends to visit with plaintiff. (Tr. 168) Plaintiff 
had, occasionally, during the winter of 1949, 1950, ex-
ehanged visits with Mrs. Lucy Robbins, who lived.near-
by, but when defendant Hilda learned of this_ she 'vent 
to ~:irs. Rob bins' home and told her not to call to see 
plaintiff again. (Tr. 169) This occured shortly before 
February 13, 1950, when plaintiff rescinded the con-
tract and moved out. 
On Monday evening February _13, Hilda took the 
plaintiff to the home of Mrs. Leva Thornton in Ogden. 
( Tr. 98) Plaintiff left the apartment because she felt 
it would be absolutely impossible to live with Hilda, be-
cause of her neglect and mistreatment, and in view of 
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Byron ,s absolute refusal to live w·ith the1n as long as 
plaintiff re1na.ined there ( Tr. 99) For son1etirne pre-
Yious to Feb!"uary 13, plaintiff had decided to rescind 
the contract of J-anuary 25, 1949. ( Tr. 100) Before 
plaintiff left for Ogden in September 1949, she felt that 
defendants \\~ere not treating her right. ( Tr. 100) And 
~ubsequently, during the fall and winte! of 1949-1950, 
plaintiff 'Yas convinced that defendants were not inter-
ested in plaintiff nor her welfare. That they let her 
~hift for herself. (Tr. 147, 149) It had affected plain-
tiff"s health. l\frs. Thornton testified that plaintiff 'vas 
nerYous and upset when she can1e to her home on Feb-
ruary 13, and that plaintiff had bruises on her arm. 
(Tr. 186, 191) Plaintiff lived with Mrs. T-hornton until 
about ~Jay 18, 1950, during which time her mental and 
physical condition improved. (Tr. 100, 188) 
When plaintiff moved to the Thornton home, Byron 
Brimm immediately rnoved into the apartment with 
Hilda. (Tr. 363) 'Vhile plaintiff 'vas living at the Thorn-
ton home, defendant Hilda Brimm called occasionally, 
and after she left, plaintiff would cry and say to Mrs. 
Thornton, "She's so hard towards me. She's not like 
Hilda used to be," and she'd fret about it. (Tr. 188) 
About May 1, 1950, Hilda told plaintiff that Byron was 
living in the home at 1\rfendon, and Mrs. Thornton testi-
fied that it had an adverse effect upon plaintiff. Plain-
tiff told 11:rs. Thornton that she just couldn't under-
stand wh~\T, "she had to be put out of her home 'vhen ~I r. 
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Brimm was living in it. She thought that she had as 
n1uch right to live there as she ever had and that she 
was going home." Mr. Thornton took her to Mendon on 
l\iay 18, 1950. (Tr. 189, 190) Defendant Hilda Brimm 
told Mrs. Thornton that she and plaintiff couldn't 
get along. (Tr. 186, 199) Plaintiff also told Mrs. Thorn-
ton that she couldn't get along with Hilda, that Hilda 
'vasn't good to her. (Tr. 198) 
Plaintiff left the Thornton hon1e on ~fay 18, 1950, 
and arrived at the home in Mendon about 10:30 a.n1. 
and proceeded to clean up the house. The next morning 
the defendants arrived from Ogden, and during the day 
an altercation ensued between defendant Hilda Brimn1 
and plaintiff. (Tr. 204-207) Plaintiff testified that Hilda 
struck her and otherwise abused her. (Tr. 215); and 
that defendant Brimm urged Hilda to "knock her down, 
slap her face." (Tr. 205) That evening plaintiff was 
found walking along one of the streets in Mendon, by 
Jay Jensen, and he picked her up and took her to the 
home of William Kidman, his father-in-law, in Peters-
boro, where plaintiff thereafter resided and was residing 
at the time of trial. (Tr. 207) 
When the defendants ·began to live ·with plaintiff 
about June 8, 1948, she had a checking account with the 
First National Bank of Logan. That on the the 16th day 
of August, 1948, the plaintiff authorized said bank to 
place Hilda Brimm's name upon the account, thus per-
mitting Hilda to draw checks against said account for 
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plaintiff's use and benefit. That beginning about June 
1, 194S, and continuing to September 10, 1949, when 
said account '\Yas closed by the defendant Hilda Brimm, 
the checks dra'\Yn against said aceount aggregated 
$3137.74. Plaintiff testified that at least $2350.00 of said 
an1ount '\Yas used for household expenses, for the mutual 
benefit of plaintiff and defendants. That during the 
school tern1 of 1948 ,1949, Hilda Brimm taught school 
at Ogden, and received a salary of $3000.00, and for the 
next tern1 1949-1950 she received $3150.00, or a total of 
$6150.00. (Tr. 357) That during the aforesaid period of 
tune defendants had no automobile of their own, so they 
used plaintiff's Pontiac sedan for family purposes, and 
for their benefit. ( Tr. 357-358) 
Prior to February 21, 1949, plaintiff was the owner 
of 160 acres of dry-farm land in Po,ver County, Idaho, 
and on February 21, 1949, when plaintiff was confined 
in the Dee Hospital at Ogden, this property was sold to 
\,..adell Swenson, of Malad, Idaho, for $8000.00, of which 
amount $4000.00 was paid in cash, and a note for the 
balance of $4000.00, secured by a first mortgage on the 
property. On February 23, 1949, while plaintiff was still 
confined in the hospital, Attorney D. R. Dickens pre-
pared what purports to be a 'vritten assignment of the 
aforesaid note and mortgage, and he and defendant 
Byron Brimm procured plaintiff's signature to said 
assignment, (Tr. 327) and it was thereafter filed for 
record with the county recorder of Power County, State 
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of Idaho, on March 4, 1949. (Defendant's Exhibit 3) 
Along in April, 1949, plaintiff was informed of the 
Hale of the Idaho property to the Swensons, and the 
terms thereof. Plaintiff inquired of Hilda if she could 
exa1nine the note of $4000.00, and the mortgage on the 
Idaho property given to secure the payment thereof. 
Fro1n that time plaintiff retained possession of these 
instruments, and when she left defendant's apartment 
on February 13, 1949, plaintiff had only 30 cents, and 
being in need of funds she made a loan with the First 
National Bank of Logan, and gave the bank an assign-
ment of the Swenson note and mortgage to secure pay-
Inent thereof. 
On or about May 25, 1950, plaintiff commenced an 
action to cancel and set aside the purported written 
assignment (Defendant's exhibit 3), in the District 
Court of Power County, Idaho, where the land conveyed 
to the Swensons is situated. The summons was duly 
·and regularly issued by the Idaho Court and was served 
upon the defendants in Cache County, Utah, on June 12, 
1950, on which date trial was commenced in the case 
at bar. When the trial was res_umed on June 21, 1950, 
(Tr. 157), the defendants moved ~the court for permis-
sion to file an amended answer to interplead the trans-
action involved in the Idaho action, in the instant case. 
And notwithstanding the District Court of Power Coun-
ty, Idaho, had acquired jurisdiction of the defendants 
by personal service of summons upon them, which they 
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did not question; (Tr. 159) and although the property 
described in the n1ortgage referred to in the written 
assign1nent, (Defendant's Exhibit 3) was located in 
Power County, Idaho, (Tr. 158) and alt~ough it "\Vas an 
entirely separate transaction from any transaction 
pleaded in plaintiff's a1nended compaint and amend-
Inents thereto, yet the trial court permitted the defend-
ants to file said a1nended answer ( tr. 161) and later 
achnitted evidence relating to said transaction over 
plaintiff's objection. (Tr. 254) 
The foregoing statement covers most of the pert-
inent facts in the case, however, if any facts have been 
overlooked, they 'vill likely be covered in the discussion 
of the evidence in the several points raised. 
The plaintiff brought this action asking: 
1. That the Court cancel, set aside, and declare 
null and void the deed and bill of sale. (Causes of actions 
1 and 4) 
2. Judgment for $2000.00, (Cause of action 2) 
3. For an accounting on checking and savings ac-
counts, and for proceeds of 1949 crops. (Causes of ac-
tions 3 and 3) 
4. Costs of Court and general relief. 
The Court by its Decree: 
1. Held against plaintiff and in favor of defend-
ants on all causes of action contained in plaintiff's a-
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mended complaint and amendments thereto. 
2. Reformed the contract of January 25, 1949, be-
tween plaintiff and defendants, relieving the latter of 
the duty of living with or rendering any services what-
soever for plaintiff and requiring only that defendants 
pay for plaintiff's keep which was fixed at $75.00 per 
month and permitting plaintiff the exclusive use of the 
home at Mendon, where she may live, and in event of 
sickness, she may hire a person to care for her at de-
fendants' cost. 
3. That the legal title to the real estate is vested in 
Hilda Brimm, together with the exclusive use thereof 
and income therefrom, provided however, that a lien is 
in1pressed thereon and sale thereof is enjoined during 
the natural life of plaintiff. 
Statement of Points Upon Which Appellant Intends to 
Rely for Reversal of Judgment and Decree. 
1. The Court erred in making the following find-
ing in Finding of Fact No. 1-that plaintiff "was at all 
times capable and competent in all respects to transact 
business,'' and the Court erred in making its finding No. 
10, and its Conclusions and Decree. 
2. The Court erred in making its Finding of Fact 
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 12, and 14, and its Conclusion 
of Law and Decree and all parts threof, and the Court 
erred by its failure and refusal to make and enter its 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and Decree, holding 
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that defendants had com1nitted a breach of the con-
tract and rescinding the san1e; also its failure and refus-
al to cancel the deed and bill of sale. 
3. The Court erred in 1naking its Finding of Fact 
ntunber 11, and its Conclusions of Law and its Decree, 
by "yhich the court has 1nodified and reformed the con-
tract of January 23, 1949, entered into between the 
parties. 
-±, The Court erred in making its Finding of Fact 
nrnnbers 6, 7, 11, 13 and making and entering its Con-
clusions of Law and Decree; in permitting the amended 
ans\Yer to be filed to include consideration of Idaho 
transaction; ( Tr. 161) in receiving evidence over plain-
tiff's objection in relation thereto; (Tr. 254) . denying 
plaintiff's motion of August 3, 1950; (Tr. 42) and deny-
ing plaintiff's motion of August 24, 1950. (Tr. 43, 44) 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
This case presents for consideration two principal 
questions: First-Did defendants agree to care for 
plaintiff as alleged in paragraph 5 of her amended com-
plaint, and did she sign the deed (Pl. Ex. '' Q' ') and the 
bill of sale (Pl. Ex. "U") in reliance upon said agree-
ment; and, Secondly, was there a breach of said agree-
ment by the defendants, as alleged in paragraphs 6, 7, 
8 of plaintiff's amended complaint. (Tr. 3, 4) 
Finding of Fact No. 10, states in part that on the 
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25th day of January, 1949, without solicitation or re-
quest of the defendants, but because of past and then re-
lationship, affection and confidence, and to save probate 
expenses, the plaintiff voluntarily and deliberately con-
veyed, the real and personal property in question, to 
defendant Hilda Brimm. No doubt that the intent and 
purpose of this finding is to show that the defendants 
n1ade no promise or agreement with plaintiff to care 
for her as consideration for the deed and bill of sale-. 
This finding is contrary to the evidence and also to 
admissions contained in defendants' answer as will be 
hereinafter referred to. Reference will first be made 
to the pleadings and then to the evidence. 
In paragraph 5 of plaintiff's complaint it is alleged 
that, defendants proposed to plaintiff, that if she would 
convey and transfer the real estate described in said 
co1nplaint to the defendant Hilda Brimm, that defend-
ant$ would live with plaintiff, care for and nurse her 
in her sick and enfeebled condition, and treat her with 
due respect and affection for and during her natural 
life, and pay for her doctor, n1edical, and funeral ex-
penses. This paragraph is re-pleaded in plaintiff's 
fourth cause of action with respect to the cancellation of 
the bill of sale, by which plaintiff pDJ<iportedly transfered 
to defendant Hilda Brimm, the personal property de-
scribed therein. (Tr. 25, 26) 
While defendants deny in their further answer (Tr. 
14) that they made any agreement with plaintiff such 
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a~ i~ alleg·ed in paragraph 5 of the plain.tiff's a1nended 
eo1nplaint, they do allege in paragraph 5 of their further 
an8\\~er ( Tr. 13), '·that upon the delivery of said deed 
as hereinbefore stated, the defendant, Byron Brin1m, 
pro1nised and agreed 'vith this defendant to assist her 
in carrying out her arrangements as herein stated to 
plaintiff," and in paragraph 6 of their further answer 
(Tr. 15) defendants allege, "That ..... this defendant, 
with the assistance of the defendant, Byron Brim1n, 
furnished and supplied the plaintiff with all possible at-
tention, comfort, kindness, con1panionship possible, and 
help in every way.'' These allegations when read to-
gether, first admit that there was an ''arrangement'' 
to care for the plaintiff, and secondly a claim of 
performance of the ''arrangement'' or agreement by 
the defendants. The foregoing allegations by the de-
fendants of the "arrangement" with plaintiff made 
prior to the time she signed the deed and bill of sale, 
concedes that there was an agreement made by the de-
fendants with plaintiff that if she would convey and 
transfer to Hilda Brimm the real and personal property 
described in deed and bill of sale plaintiff's Exs. "Q" 
and "lJ" ,that they would care for her the remainder 
of her natural life, and pay for her medical, doctor and 
funeral expenses. 
Plaintiff's recollection of the agreement made to 
her by the defendants on January 25, 1949, and prior 
to the time she signed the deed and bill of sale appears 
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in the record as follows: 
"That they would care for me, and love me 
and take care of me and bury me.'' ''Well, they 
promised to care for me if I would deed them the 
1 > roperty.'' ''They would care for me, make a 
home for me, and love me, and after it was 
through they would put me away, bury me." (Tr. 
83, 84) 
l n an atten1pt to take off the edge of their agree-
lTIPnt to care for the plaintiff as the only consideration 
for the convevanee and transfer of the title to the afore-
said real and personal property, the defendants allege 
in their ans,ver, and the trial court erronously found in 
r~inding of Fact No. 10, that, plaintiff voluntarily and 
deliberately proposed to and did convey or cause to be 
C'OnYeyed the whole of the real and personal property 
hereinbefore described or referred to, to the defendant 
Hilda .A .. Brimm.'' (Tr. 52) 
''rith respect to whether plaintiff signed the deed 
voluntarilY her testimony appearing in the record shows 
(Tr. 150, 131 
'' Q. Whether you did it voluntarily or will-
ingly. I '11 ask you whether or not you signed the 
deed when they first presented it to you. A. No, 
Sir. Q. How long did you wait before you act-
ually signed it. A. Oh, it was two or three days. 
!Q. And in the meantime, I'll ask whether or not 
you asked them to get in touch with me. A. yes, 
I did. Q. What was their response to that? A. 
Their response was that you were in the east. 
;Q. .And that I wasn't in Logan f .A. That you 
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".,.eren 't in Logan, and they wanted it fixed up 
and you weren't here.' 
The foregoing testimony shows conclusively that 
plaintiff was urged by defendants to sign the deed, and 
that she hesitated to sign it. She also testified that she 
received no n1oney consideration. ( Tr. 83) 
And it is also interesting to observe that the de-
fendant's testimony to the effect that nothing was said 
by them to plaintiff about taking care of her at the time 
she signed the deed and bill of sale, is contradicted 
by their witness, nir. Dickens. (Tr. 322, 323) On cross 
exa1nination he admitted that something was said with. 
respect to that matter by defendants to plaintiff, and as 
shown by the record he testified: 
Q. Didn't Hilda tell her there she would take 
care of her the rest of her life and support her 
and maintain her~ A. She said she'd care for her 
and see that she had a home, and look after her 
for doctor bills, hospital expenses and everything 
and provide a home for the rest of her life. Q. 
She said she'd pay for her burial expenses and 
in order words she would do everything for her 
that was required by way of support and main-
tenance and nursing, didn't she~ A. That's 
right". (Tr. 322, 323) Q. That's why she signed 
the deed~ A. Yes, she said she didn't want the 
worry of it. She wanted a place where she'd be 
taken care of by somebody that could look after 
her and she wouldn't have to worry if anything 
came along unexpected. Q. Did Mrs. Brimm say 
she'd relieve her of that worry and she wouldn't 
have anything to worry about~ A. She told her 
she would take care of her. Q. She assured her 
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of that~ A. That's right (Tr. 323) 
It will thus be seen from plaintiff's testhnony, 
which is corroborated by defendant's witness, Mr. Dick·-
ens, that before plaintiff signed the deed in question, 
the defendants promised and agreed that they would 
live with, care for her and nurse and support her and 
treat her with kindness, love and respect, as a member 
of their family. And plaintiff testified that she had 
implicit confidence in defendant Hilda, and relied upon 
her especially to carry out the aforesaid contract made 
by the defendants to plaintiff before she signd the deed 
and bill of sale. 
That portion of the foregoing finding that plaintiff 
conveyed the property to Hilda Brimn1 ''to save costs 
o£ probate" is ridiculous. When plaintiff was asked if 
this was a fact, she testified that she wouldn't be alive 
to pay it, so that, it was a matter of indifference to 
her. (Tr. 183) Evidently the defendants did not only 
'vant to avoid paying cost of probate·, but they wanted a 
deed of conveyance which to them was much 1nore secure 
than a will. 
It is stated in Finding of Fact numbers 1 and 10 
that on January 25, 1949, plaintiff was mentally alert 
and in all respects competent and capable to transact 
business. The evidence shows that plaintiff had sick 
spells during the summer of 1948 (Tr. 79), and heart 
trouble in November 1948, and was confined in the hos-
pital at Ogden, from December 19, to 29, 1948. (Tr. 81, 
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238) Plaintiff w·as again seriously stricken on Februar~,. 
20, 1949, and 'vas confined in the hospital for about three 
\Yeeks. She was sickly during the summer of 1949, (Tr. 
87) and in Septe1nber, she \Vas confined in the hospital 
at Logan for about three weeks, (Tr. 87) It 1nay be 
COnceded that she \YaS in a normal frame of mind for 
her condition, but it is doubtful that under the circtun-
stances her mind "-as very alert. 
The relationship ·between the· parties as it existed 
on January 25, 1949, prior to and and at the time plain-
tiff signed the deed and bill of sale, strongly rese1nbles 
the relationship between the parties in the recent lTtah 
case of \V.ard v. 'Vard 85 P. 2d. 635. The relationship 
there 'vas bet\veen :31rs. Ward and her son J. H. Ward, 
and the facts are very similar to the instant case. In 
that case Mrs. Ward made a will in which she devised 
her property to J. H. Ward, in consideration of his 
agreement that he and his family would occupy a portion 
of the ho1ne and care for :Nirs. Ward, and operate the 
far1n on a rental basis; and that upon her death, he 
was to pay $1000.00 to each of his four sisters. The 
terms of the oral agreement pertaining to his duties 
in the operation of the farm and ·the services that he 
and his family were expected to render for Mrs. Ward 
are stated in the opinion at page 639, as follows: 
"Defendant further agreed that he would at 
all times be a dutiful and loving son; that he and 
his family would move into a portion of the 
plaintiff's home and that they would make life 
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agreeable to plaintiff during her declining years 
and that they would .. bestow upon plaintiff that 
degree of affection that she had a right to assume 
would be bestowed upon her by her only son and 
his family." 
The foregoing agreement made by J. H. Ward to his 
InothPr was relied upon by Mrs. Ward before she exe-
('Ute<l the will, as was found by the trial court in that 
ea~e: 
''That relying upon said promises, plaintiff 
executed said will and later permitted defendant 
and his family to move into said home and there-
after entered into an oral lease as aforesaid.'' 
In the Ward case, supra, this court held in effect, 
ti1at the contract made by J. H. Ward with his mother 
should be strickly enforced, so that his aged and infirn1 
1nother would not be imposed upon. 
And under the facts and circumstances attending 
the execution and delivery of the deed and bill of sale 
in question, it is immaterial as a matter of law whether 
the plaintiff conveyed the property voluntarily or under 
pressure. When an aged person conveys property to 
a relative without money consideration, under the 
facts as shown by the evidence in this case, the law in1-
poses a strick duty upon the grantee to perform the 
contract so that the grantor will be protected. 
The rule is well stated by the Supreme Court of 
Oregon in Storey-Bracher Lumber Co. vs. Burnett el. al. 
123 Pac. 66, where the court said: 
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'" \\rhere a conveyance is made in consider-
ation of the 1naintenance of aged people, accord-
ing to the ter1ns of a contract like the one in 
question, it is the duty of the courts to zealously 
de1nand n strict perfor1nance of the conditions of 
the conveyance on the part of grantees. Thomas 
v. Thon1as, 2± Or. 251, 33 Pac. 565; Bryant v. 
Erskine, 55 ~le. 153. 
And the Supre1ne Court of Minnesota in Bruer v. 
Bruer, 123, K.\\'. 813, 28, L. R. A. (N. S.) 608, in char-
acterizing an agree1nent \vhich for1ns the consideration 
for a deed to the aged person's property stated: 
''Contracts and agreements of this kind are 
quite familiar to the courts. They are, as a rule, 
made by people well along in years, with a child 
or other relative, and are intended to secure to 
the old people proper and suitable support and 
maintenance during their declining years, at the 
same time relieving them of the care and re-
sponsibility incident to the management of their 
affairs. They part with their property in the ex-
pectation and belief that their future necessities 
and comforts are fully provided for, and in an 
abiding faith that natural affection and filial 
duty will prompt and secure a faithful discharge 
of the obligations assumed by the child to whom 
they convey. There is in such transactions an 
element of confidence reposed by the old people 
in their grantee, sacred in its nature, a breach of 
which, and retention of the benefits, no· court 
should tolerate by a refinement upon technical 
rules and principles of law. By the modern trend 
of authority these transactions are placed in a 
class by themselves, and enforced without refer-
ence to the form or phraseology of the writing 
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by which they are expressed, or whether by the 
strict letter of the law a forfeiture of the estate 
is expressly provided for." (Italics supplied) 
In O·ustin v. Crockett, (Wash.) 97 Pac. 1091, the 
Supreine Court reversed the trial court and in the course 
of the opinion said: 
''This is but the common instance of 
people who are old and infirm conveying their 
property to their children or to others in whon1 
they have trust and confidence where the consid-
eration for the conveyance is in whole or in part 
an agreement for future support and mainte-
nance. In such cases courts of equity have never 
failed to rescind the contract and cancel the deed 
for a willful violation of the agreement to sup-
port and maintain, and they never inquire whe-
ther the transaction was fraudulent in its incep-
tion or not.'' 
And likewise is the case of Lewelling v. McElroy, 
(Neb.) 27 N. ""\iV. 2d. 268, 'vhere the court held: 
"We have repeatedly held that where a 
grantor conveys land in consideration of an 
agreement of the grantee to support, maintain, 
and care for the grantor during his lifetime, 
and the grantee neglects or refuses to comply 
with the contract, the deed may be set aside and 
the title quieted in the grantor. See Mcintire v. 
Mcintire, 75 Neb. 397 ,106 N. W. 29; Tomsik v. 
Tomsik, 78 Neb. 103 110 N. W. 674; McCoy v. 
Cunningham, 141 Heb. 708, 4 N. W. 2d 835. See, 
also Wilcox v. Wilcox, 138 Neb. 510, 293, N. W. 
378; Co pass y. Wilborn, 139 Neb. 124, 296, N. W. 
565." (Italics supplied) 
In the case of Cree v. Sherify, (Ind.) 37 N. E. 787, 
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to his son for fntnre support and 1naintenance, and 
upon the violation of said agree1nent, the father sued 
for cancellation of the deed. In pointing· out the duty 
of a grantee under such facts the court adopted the 
follo"-ing rule: 
. . ''Conveyances of property by aged and in-
firlil people to their children, in consideration of 
promised support and maintenance, are some-
'vhat peculiar in their character and incidents, 
and niust so;neti1nes be dealt with by the courts 
on principles not applicable to ordinary convey-
ances. A person incapitated by the infirmities 
of age for active pursuits naturally feels a strong 
desire to place the fruits of his industry and 
enterprise where they will secure him, during the 
re1nnant of his life, a suitable and proper main-
tenance, without further care or labor on his 
part." (Italics supplied) 
It 'vill be seen from the foregoing cases that deeds 
of conveyance from aged and infirm people to their 
children or relatives, in consideration of promised sup-
port, care and 1naintenance, are scrutinized very care-
fully, so that the aged will not be imposed upon. Con-
tracts of this character are usually oral so that the 
grantee, as 'vas true in this case, 1nay contend that the 
grantor voluntarily and without any urge frorn the 
grantee, conveyed the property. Thus, in order to pro-
vide safeguards in such event, the courts hold that there 
is an ilnplied contract requiring the grantee to perfor1n 
the :services required under such contracts, and in de-
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fault thereof the conveyance is canceled and set aside. 
Point 2 
!Jid the defendants commit a breach of said contract? 
F,indings of Fact numbers 10 and 12, Conclusions 
and the De.cree state and provide that subsequent to 
,) an nary 2:-), 1949, the defendants cared for the plaintiff 
a n<l extended to her all possible attention, comfort, kind-
ne~s and cornpanionship and help in every way. That is. 
the eourt found, concluded and decreed that defendants 
had performed the contract made by them prior to the 
ti1ne the deed and bill of sale were signed by plaintiff. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in mak-
ing the aforesaid findings, conclusions and decree, be-
cause they are not supported by the evidence but are 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence, as will 
be hereinafter shown. 
Plaintiff alleged in paragraph six, seven, and eight 
of her amended complaint, that, beginning in the month 
of July, 1949, the defendant Byron Brimm continuously 
thereafter refused to associate with or live with the 
plaintiff. With respect to how the defendant Brimin 
treated plaintiff in the summer of 1949, her testimony 
appears in the record as follows: Q. Do you know whe-
ther any trouble arose there between you and Mr. Brimn1 
during the summer, last summer~ A. Yes. Q. When 
was it~ What happened there~ A. Well, he refused to 
eat at the same table with me and he wouldn't talk 
to me and-and if I asked him anything it wasn't any of 
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n1y affairs. Q. Did you attempt to talk to hi1n on various 
occasions~ .A.. 1-\ nu1nber of times. Q. And can you 
state to the Court in a general 'vay what he said to you 
on those occasions~ .. A ... 'Vell, he didn't care to talk to 
Ine, that ""as all, that I can re1nen1ber. Q. I '11 ask you 
w-hether or not he associated with you in the house. A. 
\Vell, no because he 'vouldn 't eat at the same table with 
me. Q. And did you see him or talk to him in the house 
between 1neals. A. Yes, sir, in the evenings, somethnes. 
Not very often. Q ...... tilld state what his attitude wa~ 
towards you on those occasions. A. Well, he wouldn't 
talk, that was all. He didn't want me around. (Tr. 88, 
89) 
And proof of the fact that defendant Brimm con-
tinued to manifest the same attitude towards plaintiff 
is also shown by her testimony: Q. Calling your atten-
tion to the time after you went to Ogden in the fall of 
1949, state whether or not Mr. Brimm came down there 
during the fall. A. Yes, he did. Q. Did he call there 
and live with you in the apartment. A. No, sir. Q. What 
happened then~ Just tell the Court what happened. A. 
He lived in the Ben Lomond and I lived in the apart-
ment with Mrs. Brimm. (Tr. 89) 
And moreover, when the defendant Byron Brimm 
absented himself from the plaintiff during the fall and 
winter of 1949-1950, she not only lost the benefit of his 
companionship, considerate and respectful treatment, 
but plaintiff also thereby lost a large portion of the care, 
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respectful treatment and companionship of defendant 
flilda Brimm, who during the fall and winter of 1949 di-
vided her time between her husband and the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff testified that after Hilda Brimm returned to the 
aparhnent from the weekend visits with her husband, 
that she exhibited very little if any interest, considera-
tion, or affection for plaintiff, and she was cross and 
i r rita ble with her. 
There is also testimony to the effect that after 
Hilda Brim1n returned from Minnesota about January 
1~ 1950, that she neglected the plaintiff as disclosed by 
plaintiff's testimony: Q. Now will you state to the 
Court, as near as you can recall, what Mrs. Brimm did 
or failed to do for you after she came back fron1 Min-
nesota in caring for you and so on. A. Well, it was 
about the same as before. She didn't show as much in-
terest in me when she came from ~iinnesota. Q. Did she 
make any statements with respect to how it was affect-
jng she and her husband~ A. -Yes, it was causing a 
separation between them, she said, -because I was living 
in the apartment and Mr. _Brimm refused to come back 
while I was there (Tr. 92, 93) 
"' And in addition to the foregoing neglect which 
would affect plaintiff mentally, the evidence reveals 
that defendant Hilda Brimm abused her physically. 
This is _shown by plaintiff's testimony: Q. I'll ask you 
to state whether or not Mrs. Brimm took hold of you 
1n any manner during that time after she came back 
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fro1n :Jlinnesota. ~\. Yes, she did. Q. "\Vill you describe 
that to the Court: \Y.hat did she do, if anythingo? A. She 
"~ouldn 't let n1e go out because-and then she said I 
. 
"¥as also a n1enace to the aparhnent. Q. Did she tell 
you 'Yh~~o? Did she explain or tell you why you were a 
Inenace ~ ~-1... X o. Q. .._\nd no'v I '11 as~tyou whether or 
not :Jirs. Brin1111 struck you or pushed you or anything· 
like that. .._-\.. Yes, sir, she did. Q. Describe just how she 
did that. ''7ha t did she do to you 1 A. \V ell, I was 
going out one day and she didn't want n1e to, and I 
had 1ny coat and was going to put it on, and she 
didn't "~ant 1ne to go out, and she took hold of n1e 
and pushed 1ne. Pushed you how~ Where did she 
push you. ..._\. Oh, just around the room. She said I 
w ..asn't going out. Q. what part of your body did she 
pusht _._\. Around my arn1s. Q. And what is the re-
sult of that~? What happened then as a result of that'? 
Did you stay in the apartment then~ A. Yes, sir. (Tr. 
94, 95) z 
The foregoing evidence clearly indicates the result 
of the· attitude sho"rn by the defendant Byron Brimm 
as early as July, 1949, when he first refusd to talk 
to or associate with plaintiff, which contributed directly 
to the defendant's breach of the contract, made between 
the plaintiff and defendants on January 25. 1949. This 
contract could not possibly continue with any degree of 
success when defendant Brimm was continuously re-
maining away fro1n and not associating 'vith the plain-
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tiff. During the period of time from July, 1949, to 
February 13, 1950, a period of seven months, the plain-
tiff did not receive, from defendant Byron Brimm, any 
cornpanionship,, care or personal attention. This is 
one or the ilnportant elements under the contract. Ward 
v \Vard 85 P 2d. 635; Payette v. Ferrier (Wash) 55 P. 
G29; Thomas v. Thomas (Oregon) 33 Pac. 565; De Atley 
v. Street (Montana) 263 Pac. 967; Anderson v. Reed 
{New ~Iexico) 148 Pac. 502; Lewelling v. MeElroy 
(Neb.) 27 N. W. 2d. 268; Caldwell v. Mullin (Colo.) 
71 P. 2d. 415; Haataza v. Saarenpaa, (Minn.) 136 N. W. 
871; Cree v. Sherfy (Ind.) 37 N. E. 787. 
Under such circumstances it is not difficult to 
conclude that plaintiff was neglected, and did not re-
ceive that kind, considerate and respectful treatment, 
nor the care, love and affection that she was entitled to 
under the terms of the contract which constituted the 
consideration for the deed and bill of sale. 
It is therefore submitted that the court erred in 
making its Findings of Fact numbers 10, 12, and 14, (Tr. 
51, 54, 56) wherein it found that the defendants did not 
commit a breach of said contract, but on the contrary, if 
a breach was committed, it was caused solely by reason 
of the actions of the plaintiff, and that the defendants 
''extended to plaintiff all possible attention, comfort, 
kindness and companionship possible and help in every 
way, but to no avail.'' 
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And the Court likewise erred in its Conclusions of 
La,Y, ... ''That the defendants are entitled to a decree 
finding and determining that the agreement entered 
into between plaintiff and said defendants are valid, 
effectual and binding one and that the said defendants 
.,., J~ 
substantially performed the same; (Tr. 56) ,l(;fefend-
ant Byron Brimm atten1pted to explain his failure to 
associate with or render any care for plaintiff by saying 
that she was dissatisfied with the John C. Anderson 
deal, of June 23, 1949. This was denied by plaintiff, 
and she testified that his attitude began to change a-
gainst her in the latter part of July, 1949, at least a 
n1onth after the .Anderson deal was consumated. Plain-
tiff made some inquiries about his apparent neglect 
of the crops, and he told her it was none of her business. 
It must also be remembered that the defendant 
Byron Brimm began to turn against the plaintiff after 
she had conveyed to his wife the record title to 8/9th of 
the real property described in plaintiff's complaint; and 
transferred by ·bill of sale the farm implements, house-
hold furniture and two milk cows; and also provided 
Hilda with the sum of $2000.00, to purchase the 1/9th 
interest in the real property, and had also authorized 
that First National Bank to place Hilda Brimm's name 
on the checking and savings accounts, giving her. autlior-
ity to withdraw money from both accounts. Then, and 
not until then did he begin to change· his attitude to-
wards plaintiff as shown by the foregoing testimony. 
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'l'his property, real and personal 1s admittedly worth 
$12,600, and apparently his attitude towards her was 
engendered by reason of the fact that afteT the prop-
<>rty passed fro1n the proprietorship of the plaintiff to 
l-tilda Brim1n, plaintiff then became, in the eyes of de-
fendant Brim1n, a rnere vassal. She had placed herself 
in bondage, and so far as he was concerned· she was 
under his control as lord and 1naster. Although the 
record title to the property was vested in Hilda Brimm, 
the evidence fairly shows that defendant Brimm con-
sidered hhnself as proprietor of the property. And it is 
also fairly deducible from the evidence that defendant 
Byron Brinun strongly influences and dominates the 
actions of defendant Hilda Brhnm. And they re-acted 
accordingly, against the plaintiff. 
The reaction of the defendants aginst the plaintiff 
and particularly that of defendant Brimm, fits a pattern 
quite prevalent in cases of this type. It seems to gen-
erate from the thought on the part of the grantee or his 
or near relatives, that as soon as the deed is filed of 
record, that the grantee then becornes the absolute owner 
of the property. They entirely forget the important 
.factor that the grantee holds the title as a trustee, dur-
ing the li.fetin1e of the grantor, Glocke v. Glocke, (Wis.) 
89 N. W. 118, 57 L. R. A. 458. They also forget that 
the contract which .forms the consideration for the 
deed, is a continuing contract, and is not entirely per-
formed until the death of the grantor. Ward v. Ward, 
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85 P. 2d. 635 and Payette Y. Ferrier ('Vash) 55 Pae. 
629. 
Fron1 the adjudicated cases, it appears th-at the coul-
panionship, and cheerful consi~eration of the grantor 
is, for the 1nost part, shown prior to the time the deed 
is executed and filed of record, and that thereafter, 
very frequently the '• defendants assun1e an entirely 
different attitude towards the grantor.'' Ward v. Ward, 
Supra, Sprangler, et al. v. Yarborough (Okla) 101 P. 
1107, 1fcClelland v. ~1:cClelland (Ill.) 51 N. E. 559, Coy-
wendall v. Kellogg (North Dakota) 198 N. W. 472 and 
other cases too numerous to cite. 
The case of Spangler, el.al. v. Yarborough, supra, 
the pertinent facts are stated in the court opinion in the 
following language : 
''The petition states substantially that plain-
tiff is aged, infirm, with mind impaired, and in 
poor health; that defendants are his sister and 
her children; that on October 24, 1905, he was 
the owner of a certain tract of land in said coun-
ty, which was his homestead and which he de-
scribed; that by means of false and fraudulent 
promises and statements made to him by defend-
ants which he relied on, believing the same to be 
true, he was induced by them to enter into a con-
tract to convey to defendant Myrtle M. Spangler, 
his neice, his said homestead, which he did, in 
consideration of which defendants, in substance, 
therein agreed to provide him with a comfortable 
home for life, together will all necessary food, 
clothing, and medicines and the use of a horse 
and buggy, and, in consideration of his personal 
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property which he turned over to them, to pay his 
debts; that as soon as said contract was signed and 
said deed delivered, defendants assumed an en-
tirely different attitude towards him, and wholly 
failed to comply with their contract, and are try-
ing to sell said land with a view to leaving the 
country for parts unknown and leave him on 
<·harity; that he had no adequate remedy at law, 
and prayed that said deed and contract be can-
eeled.'' (Italics supplied). 
In ~tftClelland v. l\IcClelland (Ill.) 51 N. E. 559, the 
court, after reviewing the .evidence, said: 
"It would appear, however, that his kindness 
to her was for the most part prior to the time 
-when the deed in question was filed for record, 
to-wit, on December 24, 1892. Prior to this time, 
to-wit on August 16, 1892, his father left the 
premises, and remained away until January, 1893, 
but returned in January, 1893, and remained un-
til December 2, 1893, when both he and his wife 
were obliged to leave the premises. The convic-
tion forced upon the mind by reading the testi-
mony is that the conduct of the plaintiff in error 
towards his mother changed after she had direct-
ed the custodian of the deed to record it.'' (Italics 
supplied) 
And the above mentioned pattern was manifested in 
the Ward case from the following language found in 
the opinion on page 640, 85 P. 2d 
"that the plaintiff has pleaded with defend-
ant to change his course of conduct and to live 
up to his agreement but the defendant has shown 
a disposition to be inattentive, cold in his attitude 
and somewhat disrespectful in his treatment of 
plaintiff; that during the winter of 1935-6 the 
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defe!tdant ,zcould go for 1ceeks tt'ithout speaking.'' 
(Italics supplied) 
It i8 respectfully sub1nitted that \Vhat is said in tl1P 
\\~ ard case can be directly applied to the instant case. 
The parties in the case at bar got along agreeably until 
after the last transaction was completed, on June 23, 
1949. Defendants both lived with plaintiff from June, 
1~)-±S. till about July, 1949, 'vith no disagreement or 
trouble. 
It is only natural too, that when Byron Brimm re-
fused to be friendly to or associate with plaintiff that 
it influenced Hilda Brimm, adversely, in her attitude 
to,vards plaintiff. It is fairly deducible from the evi-
dence that living under such circumstances would draw 
both defendants away from plaintiff and she thereby 
lost their companionship. She was thus left alone. 
Yet, under the contract of January 25, 1949, she 
was entitled to the support, respectful attention, and 
cheerful companionship of both defendants. (Ward v. 
Ward 85 P. 2d. 625.) 
As proof of the fact that the defendant's neglect 
of plaintiff was noticable to her in the summer and fall 
of 1949, attention is drawn to the following testimony: 
Q. I'll ask you this question, Mrs. Gibbons. Had you for 
so1ne time previous to the day you left the apartment 
and went to Mrs. Thornton's place, decided to rescind 
this contract that was entered into1 A. Yes, sir. Q. 
How long previous to that had you felt that way~ A. 
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Oh, it started in the fall. Q. In the fall of 19491 _A_. 
"\~ es, sir, he fore I left for Ogden, I could see it wasn't 
right. Q. After that time were you n1ore or less dis-
Hatisfied 'vith the treatment you were getting there~ 
.A. I was. Q. Did you feel like you could have remained 
there 'vithout affecting your health 1 A. No, sir. Q. 
Hh.ve yon felt better since you moved out of there·~ A. 
I have, ~~es sir. (Tr. 99, 100) 
.t\nd as further evidence of the fact that plaintiff 
d<~finitely decided that she would rescind the contract 
before she left defendant's apartment on February 13, 
1950, was the fact that she requested defendant Hilda 
Br1nin1 to reconvey the property to her. That such re-
quest "~as 1nade by plaintiff is admitted by defendants 
in their ans\\Ter, (Par. 8) wherein they allege that Hilda 
refused upon demand to reconvey the property. (Tr. 11) 
And as evidence of the fact that plaintiff could not 
continue to re1nain with defendant Hilda Brimm and be 
further Inistreated and neglected by defendants as she 
had been over the period of time fro1n July, 1949, to 
Februery 13, 1950, is evidenced by· plaintiff's testimony: 
Q. Now I'll ask you whether or not you would live with 
~Ir. and !frs. Brim1n in the future. A No ,sir. Q. Why 
\vouldn't you do that~ A. Well, because I'd expect the 
same treatmen that I have received. Q. From the treat-
Inent you received when you moved out of the place~ A. 
Yes, sir. Q. And you wouldn't want to put up with that 
any longer; is that what you mean 1 A. Yes, sir, I couldn't 
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them under the conditions you lived under before you 
left~ A. No, sir, I couldn't. (Tr. 11-!) 
The foregoing evidence sho,vs that the plaintiff ex-
ercised extre1ne patience 'vith defendants during the 
aforesaid period of time, but their attitude towards her 
did not improve but gre'v gradually worse. 
Plaintiff testified it was affecting her health. She 
'vas becoming very nervous, and 1\Irs. Thornton testified 
that plaintiff was highly nervous and shaky when she 
arrived at her home on February 13th. (Tr. 186) Mrs. 
Thornton also testified that plaintiff had bruises on 
her arms when plaintiff arrived at her home on Feb-· 
ruary 13, 1950. (Tr. 186) It was very apparent from the 
foregoing evidence that for plaintiff to have remained 
in defendant's apartment longer under such an atnlos-
phere was not only intolerable but also i1npossible. 
Thus, the situation prevailing there with respect to 
how defendants' neglect and mistreatment of the plain-
tiff was affecting her health was identical to the manner 
in which Mrs. vVard's health was affected in the Ward 
case. This court said at page 635, 85 P. 2d. "that plain-
tiff has become ill in body and highly nervous.'' 
And as justification for plaintiff's decision to re-
scind the contract and request a reconveyance of the 
property, (plaintiff- was not then aware that she had 
made the bill of sale) is well stated in Johnson v. Paul-
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son, (l\iinn.) 114 N. W. 739; 
''that said defendants have been unkind to 
8aid plaintiff and that by reason of such treat-
lnent and disposition and feeling which they now 
1naintain towards the plaintiff, and the plaintiff 
towards them, It is improper and unfit that 
plaintiff should live upon the premises with the 
defendants, as it was contemplated by the afore-
said deed of conveyance that she should, and by 
their conduct said defendants have rendered it 
i n~possible to carry out the provisions and con-
ditions of the aforesaid conveyance; that said 
plaintiff lived with said defendants upon the a-
foresaid pre1nises until on or about the 1st day of 
January, 1906, when she left the same because of 
the aforesaid faults and neglects of said defend-
ants." (Italics supplied) 
And moreover, the courts hold that in cases of this 
nature, when there is evidence of a condition existing 
between the grantor arid grantee, resulting from neglect 
by the grantee, or the creation of a condition, that ef-
fects the well being of the grantor, and they cannot live 
together, then the grantor 1nay rescind the contract, 
and is entitled to be revested with the title of the prop-
erty. From the evidence in this case it is apparent that 
such a condition had arisen between the parties. Mrs. 
Thornton testified that when Hilda Brim called her on 
the phone to inquire if plaintiff could live there, Mrs. 
Thornton asked Mrs. Brimm what was the matter and 
the latter replied,-. ''We can't get along together.'' 
(Tr. 186) Under similiar situation this Court in the 
Ward case held that a breach of the contract had been 
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conunitted by the son and his family in their neglect 
of his mother. The findings of the trial court which 
this Court held 'vas supported by the evidence appears 
in the opinion as follo,vs : 
''yet the court recognized the utter impos-
sibility of plaintiff and defendant and his family 
to continue to live in one home; that said diffi-
culties have led to a family estrangement and, 
as a result thereof, defendant and his family 
do not treat the plaintiff with the consideration 
that one might expect; that plaintiff has become 
ill in body and highly nervous and that it is 
impossible for the plaintiff and the defendant and 
his family to live any longer in the same house.'' 
And another case in point arose in Colorado, Cald-
well v. ~Iullin, 71 P. 2d. 415, where the plaintiff deeded 
his property to his daughter in consideration of the 
daughter's promise to support and care for him for life. 
The daughter lived up to the agreement for about 2¥2 
years, when she married. And as a result of the mar-
riage, the daughter's attitude changed. 
The trial court canceled the deed. The Supreme 
Court affirmed the judgment, saying that, 
''The daughter admits that everything was 
serene until she married. xxThe father had spent 
a lifetime accumulating the little fortune, and 
was entitled to have it used for his comfort, peace 
and security. The plan formulated by the father 
and daughter failed of that purpose.'' 
The Washington case of Gardner v. Frederick et. 
al. 165 Pac. 85, is very similar to the facts in the case 
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at bar, and the trial court canceled the deed and· the 
Supre1ne Court of that State affirmed the judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff, a lady 72 years of age who 
eonveyed property to her daughter and son-in-law in 
consideration of their agreement to care for and support 
her during the remainder of her life. After the plaintiff 
had lived with the defendants about 4 month, she left 
their home and lived with her other children. The de-
fendants, on appeal, contended that there was ... ''no 
~ubstantial evidence that the appellants failed to furnish 
the respondent, during the time that she resided with 
the111, the necessary physical co1nforts," but the Court 
held: 
''The aged parent is entitled to respectful 
and considerate·· treatment, such as would natur-
ally be· prompted by the filal affection of a child. 
Without setting out in detail here the testimony 
involving an apparently somewhat bitter con-
roversy between near relatives, it may be said 
that the evidence was sufficient to justify the 
jury in believing that the appellants did not show 
to the respondent, during the time that she re-
sided with them, that respectful and kindly con-
sideration to which she was entitled. There is 
some evidence that there was a deliberate attempt 
to withhold from her that gentle sympathy which 
not only would be prompted by filial affection, 
but which the law, in cases of this character, de-
mands. (Italics supplied) 
In all of the reported cases examined by the writer, 
none has been found- to be more extreme in establishing 
a breach of the contract than the instant case. In no 
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case has the facts sho\\"D that one of the parties re-
nlained R\Yay fron1 the grantor for a continuous period 
of about seven n1onth~, and until after plaintiff left 
defendant ~s apartn1ent, ns 'vas ad1nittedly true in the 
case at bar. It is difficult to in1agine ho"r any individuaL 
'vould feel con1fortable living with one spouse, and 
kno,:t.ring that her presence in the hon1e was keeping the 
other spouse a'Yay. And then being told that her pres-
ence in the home would likely result in a separation of 
the parties. Is there any vvonder that plaintiff was 
driven to such desperation that on Sunday, February 
12th, and in cold winter weather, she asked Mr. and 
Mrs. Robbins to take her to her home in Mendon~ 
.._;\ case somewhat similar but not nearly so extreme, 
is the case of Dodge v. Dodge, (1fich.) 52 N. W. 296~ 
w .. hich is annotated in 112 A. L. R. 697, as follows: 
"Where the complaint made was that one of 
the grantees had treated the grantors with such 
unkindness as to render it impossible for them 
to continue to live in the grantee's- home, the 
courts, although conceding that the grantors had 
at times, been exasperating in their conduct, held 
it quite clear that through the fault of the offend-
ing grantee, the purposes for which the convey-
ance was made had been defeated and that it 
would be alike inequitable to .require the grantors 
longer to attempt to live in the grantees' family 
or to compel them to seek relief by abandoning 
the home of their choice." (Italics supplied) 
It will thus be seen from the decision of this court 
in the Ward case, supported by the decisions in the 
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~{ichigan, Colorado, and Washington cases, which hold 
that if any condition develops between the parties so 
tTtat they cannot live harmonously together, and the 
grantee does not render the services required by the 
eontract, then there is a failure of consideration, and a 
<'onsequent breach of the contract. 
It is respectfully submitted that when the decision 
in the \V ard case, supported by the other cases herein 
referred to is applied to the evidence in this case, that 
the findings, conclusions and decree made and entered by 
the trial court to the effect that defendants had not 
connni tted a breach of the contract is highly inequitable, 
is against the great 'veight of the evidence and con-
8titutes a rniscarriage of justice. 
And rnoreover, the defendants have failed to per-
form the contract under which the property was con-
veyed, and there is a failure of consideration, why_should 
the defendant Hilda Brimm in equity and justice be 
permitted to retain title to the property and operate the 
farn1 ~ They violated the implicit trust once imposed in 
, them by plaintiff. They had their opportunity and 
" apparently didn't appreciate it. They wanted the prop-
erty hut didn't want to render the necessary services 
to acquire it under the terms of the contract. If they 
had exhibited a conscientious, cooperative and friendly 
attitude towards plaintiff, no trouble would have ensued . 
. But after the conveyance, bill of sale, and assignments 
'vere made, defendants exhibited an avaricious attitude. 
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They thought more of property values than hu1nan 
values. 
In Finding of Fact No. 5, the Court stated that 
all of the n1oney checked out and 'vithdrawn fro1n the 
rhecking and savings account was used for plaintiff's 
and no other purpose. Plaintiff testified that she signed 
most of the checks in blank and an examination of the 
checks will disclose this fact. From the appearance of 
the checks and the fact that approxin1ately $2350.00, 
\vas checked out for household purposes, between June 
1, 1948, and September 10, 1949, presents a strong in-
ference that these ch~.cks were also drawn for defend-
ants use and benefit, at least defendants received a sub-
stantial benefit therefrom. (Tr. 10). However, it was 
not the plaintiff's principal purpose in bringing the 
third cause of action to show a miss-use of funds as 
much as it was to show that plaintif's checking and 
savings accounts were exhausted during the time that 
these parties lived together and that the money, for the 
most part, was used for family expenses. That is, for 
the benefit of defendants as well as plaintiff. In prac-· 
tically all of the reported cases the facts show that tho 
grantee supports the grantor from his or her means, 
vvhile the purpose of the third cause of action in this 
case was to bring before the court the fact that plaintiff 
had substantial savings and checking accounts, and both 
of them were exhausted during the time the defendants 
lived with her. The evidence shows that these accounts 
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were closed out in the 1nonths of September, and Decent-
her, 1949. 
In Finding of Fact No. 4, it is stated that John C. 
Anderson, conveyed a one-ninth undivided interest in 
the real property to defendant Hilda Brimm, for 
$2000.00, which was paid by the with-drawal of this 
an1ount fro1n plaintiff's savings account. When this 
transaction occurred on June 23, 1949, plaintiff was sick 
and unable to leave her home. ( Tr. 112) Plaintiff test-
ified that Hilda received the $2000.00, to pay for this 
interest in said property,- ''under the same condition 
that she receivd the home". (Tr. 179) It would there-
fore follow that if defendants failed to live with and care 
for plaintiff until her demise, there would be a failure 
of eonsideration and plaintiff should be entitled to the 
return of her 1noney. 
In Finding of Fact No. 2, it is stated that plaintiff 
hired defendant Byron Brimm to care for the crops 
during the su1mner of 1948. The crops· had been planted 
"'rhen the defendants arrived at Mendon in June, 1948. 
Defendant Brimm had been unemployed for about eight 
1nonths prior to this ti1ne. Plaintiff said that no partic-
ular arrangement had been made about caring for the 
crops and this seems to be corroborated by the testimony 
of Hilda Briinm; ''A. When "\Ve came up to Mendon to 
spend the suminer with her, she said, 'Don't make any 
plans of giving up your apartment or your job,' be-
cause it seems she had made arrangements with some 
one else to get the crops, and she says, 'There is no-
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tl1ing here for you. You n1ight as 'vell keep your school 
and apartment,' which 've did.'' ('rr. 257) It thus 
appears that they lived together as a family during tho 
sun1n1er of 1948, the incon1e fron1 the farn1 crops were 
deposited to the plaintiff's checking account, and the 
money was checked out for fan1ily use. (Tr. 21, 22) The 
defendants had no car at that time and they used plain-
tiff's car for family purposes, and for their owu use. 
(Tr. 357) 
In connection with this matter it should also be 
re1ne1nbered that defendants kept the entire inco1ne front 
tlie crops gro-\vn upon the property in the year 1949, 
and were living in the home and operating the plaintiff's 
car for their personal use, (Tr. 357) and checks were 
dra"\1\-ru against plaintiff's bank account for family use, 
during the cropping season of 1949. (Tr. 22, 23) In other 
words, while plaintiff's checking and savings accounts 
''rere being diminished defendant Brimm was operating 
the farm during the year 1949, and none of the receipts 
were deposited to plaintiff's bank accounts. (see PI's 
Exs. G to 0 inclusive, and Ex. T.) These bank statement 
disclose that no amou!lt was deposited to either account 
except the sum of $86.85, which was deposited to the 
checking account on August 17, 1949, and it doesn't ap-
pear· from what source this sum was received. And the 
judgment awarded the crops for 1950 to defendants. 
Point 3 
Finding of Fact No. 11, the Conclusions of I~aw, and 
pe&I fi CHI h hat S@llP@@ t@is SllfH V18:8 Feeev;eEl. 
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tT1e Decree, state and provide that the defendant Hilda 
A. Brimm is the owner of the property in question, and 
that she now stands, ready, willing and anxious to per-
fo nn her part of the agreement. It further states and 
provides that her husband, defendant Byron , Brimm, 
al~o is willing to cooperate therein. And they have con-
sented and agreed that plaintiff may live alone in her 
ho1ne at ~iendon, and defendants will pay for her keep, 
inc] uding the reasonable cost of a lady to assist plaintiff 
in the event of her illness. 
It will thus be seen that the court, by the fore-
going findings, conclusions and decree, has made a ,new 
and different contract than the one made by the parties 
herein, the terms of which are alleged in paragraph five 
of plaintiff's amended complaint. That contract, by its 
terms, provided that if plaintiff would convey and trans-
fer her real and personal property to the defendant 
Hilda Brimn1, that the defendants would live with the 
plaintiff, care for and nurse her in her sick and enfeebl-
ed. condition, and treat her 'vith due respect and affec-
tion, and 1naintain and support her and be companions 
to her for and during the remainder of her natural life. 
And the ter1ns of the contract as so alleged is con-
ceded by the court in its finding No. 10, (Tr. 52) wherein 
the court finds,- ''that said conveyances were so made 
to the said Hilda A. Brim~ in consideration, xxx that 
plaintiff be permitted to live with the said Hilda A. 
Brim1n and her husband, Byron, Brimm, as a member 
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of their fan1ily, 'Yithout paying any amount therefor, 
during the re1nainder of plaintiff's life." 
It is respectfully subn1it~ed that the court had no 
po"'"er to 1nake a new and different contract between 
the parties as 'vas 1nade by its Findings of Fact No. 
11 ,and its Conclusions and Decree "!herein the defend-
ants are relieved of perforn1ing~ the principal duties 
required by the original contract. 
In ±5 ..._.\ln. Jur. 58f, the rule is stated: 
''A cou:~;t has no power to supply an agree-
ment which was never made, or to alter or amend 
a contract which the parties themselves have 
understandingly made, for it is the province of 
courts to enforce contracts, not make or alter 
them." (Italics supplied.) 
In Deseret National Bank v. Burton, 17 Utah 43, 
53 P. 215, this Court held: 
''A court of equity has no power to alter or 
reform an agreement made between the parties 
since this would be in truth the power to con-
tract for them." 
The courts emphasize the importance of the per-
sonal care, companionship, kindly and affectionate 
treatment as well as support and maintenance by the 
grantee to the grantor. The cases unaninously hold that 
the consideration for a deed of this charcter becomes a 
personal and continuing duty, and strict performance 
rests upon the grantee and cannot be shifted or trans-
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fered to another. In support of this doctrine, reference 
is n1ade to the language used by the courts in the follow-
lug cases: 
rl,he Hupren1e Court of Washington in Payette v. 
l~.,errier, 35 l'ac. 629, at page 630, said: 
"It appears from the complaint in the pre-
Bent case that the sole consideration for the con-
veyance from the plaintiff to his daughter and 
her husband was their agreement to support and 
1naintain him. The duty to do so was arid became 
a personal and continuing one. The obligation 
was not assignable, but to be performed by them 
only xxxx We think there is also another 
reason why the plaintiff is entitled to be revested 
U'ith title. The covenants of the grantees to sup-
port and maintain the plaintiff were personal, 
and died with them. The happening of that event 
put an end to the obligation. Upon principle, the 
question does not differ from the one we have 
just discussed. The right of the parent to a return 
rests in either case upon the failure of consider-
ation, and inability of his child to render the ser-
vice or perform the condition upon which he was 
intrusted with the property.'' (Italics supplied) 
In an early Oregon case, Thomas v. Thomas, 33 Pac. 
GG5, the court said: 
''The contract of the defendant S. K. Thomas 
to give his father a home and support upon the 
the land, as a part of the consideration for the 
conveyance, was a personal obligation, to be per-
formed by him alone, and could not be assigned, 
without consent of the father, so as to substitute 
some other person in his place. The principal 
consideration for the deed to the son was the 
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support and n1aintenance of the plaintiff upon 
the farn1 during his old age, by one of his own 
flesh and blood, and not by a stranger. His ob-
ject was to have his son reside and take care of 
hin1 during the remainder of his life, on the 
premises co~veyed. This was the motive which 
prompted him to make the conveyance, and the 
condition upon 'vhich it was accepted." (Italics 
supplied) 
The Supreme Court of Montana, in De Atley v. 
Streit, 263 Pac. 967, held that the grantee's duty under 
the contract could not be transferred to another person. 
''It is very generally held that a contract 
like that in question is a personal one and cannot 
be transferred to a third person without the con-
sent of the parent, and that an attempt so to do 
gives the parent the right to revest the property 
in himself. The reason for the ·ruling is obvious. 
the parent contracts for -his support and main-
tenance ·by one of his own kin, one who will treat 
him with the reverence, respect, affection and 
devotion due to him from one of his own flesh and 
blood, and not ~or such mere formal contributions 
as a stranger would make. The above ruling is 
anounced and many cases are cited in Thomas v. 
Thomas, 24 Or. 251, 33 P. 565.' 
In the case of Anderson v. Reed, (N. M.) 148 Pac. 
502, the facts are very similar to those in the case at bar. 
In discussing the nature of this sort of contract, the 
court said: 
"Such a consideration as the above is not re-
garded as an ordinary obligation, but is of a 
peculiar character, imposing upon the grantee 
burdens which must be performed, if he would 
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retain the benefits of the contract. Courts of 
equity, because of the inadequacy of any legal 
remedy, do not hesitate to set aside such contracts 
upon proof of failure to perform by the grantee. 
Such courts are not so much concerned as to the 
proper theory upon which such contracts may be 
avoided, as they are that they must be set aside 
inorder to prevent grave injustice and the im-
position upon aged people, by unscrupulous per-
sons who pretend love, devotion, and friendship, 
u,'here no one of such elements exists." (Italics 
supplied) 
In the Nebraska case of Lewelling v. McElroy, 27 
N. W. 2d 268, the nature and purpose of the action is 
stated in the opinion as follows: 
' ' This is an action to cancel a deed to real 
estate on the ground that the consideration there-
for 'vas a promise to care for the grantor during 
her life time. xxx The grantor pleaded that the 
grantee and his wife promised that if grantor 
'vould convey the property to them, they 
would remain in the home and care for her 
as long as she lived, and that relying on 
the promise and without any other consideration 
she made the conveyance. xxx Was there a failure 
of the consideration~ What did the grantor con-
tract to receive and the grantee to furnish~ The 
grantor had a home, a rental property, and her 
pension. These obviously were sufficient to furn-
ish food and clothing and shelter. Just as obvious-
ly she contracted to receive that attention and 
care that an old lady desired over and above 
physical wants. The care was to continue during 
the ,life time of the ,qrantor. That she did not re-
ceive." (Italics supplied) 
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It 'vill thus be seen fro1n the decisions that the 
grantee shall retain the title to the property only as long 
a~ the grantee continues to render personal services for 
the grantor. Ho,vever, by the decision of the trial court 
in the instant case, the defendants are relieved front 
living \Yith or rendering any further personal service 
for the plaintiff, but nevertheless, are permitted to re-
tain the title and possession of the property, and the 
inco1ne therefron1. Defendants are now permitted to live 
separate and apart fron1 plaintiff, and are merely re-
quired to pay for her- keep, 'vhich the court has fixed 
at $75.00 per month, (Tr. 518) and permit plaintiff to 
live in the home. The latter provision is no hinderance 
to defendants as they live in Ogden, where defendant 
Hilda Brimm is now teaching school. But the plain-
tiff is required to live alone and shift for herself. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court has made a 
ne\v contract between the parties, by which the consid-
eration has been materially, if not entirely changed. 
In arriving at its decision as to whether the:re was 
or was not a breach of the contract committed by the 
defendants in this case, the court adopted a very unique 
n1ethod of procedure, as the record will disclose: 
J1tly 31, 1950 ( T r. 499-501) 
THE COURT: "Without passing judgment on the 
merits at this time, the Court is going to allow the de-
fendant five days to elect, if they so desire, whether 
the Court may make findings and decree to the effect 
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that this lady (plaintiff) n1ay reside in that house the 
rest of her natural days and hire whatever housekeepers 
:-;he wants, at reasonable expense to be fixed ·by this 
t~onrt. xxx hut otherwise the court enters an order in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants set-
ting aside all deeds, bills of sales and every. conveyance 
of every kind and nature and permitting the defendants 
to have this year's crop, less the taxes, in full for all 
~ervices, but also awarding them 1/9 of this ground 
to take care of the deed she'd made.' 
l\IR. HEINRICH: ''As far as we're concerned, Your 
I-Ionor, the consent may be deemed to be put in the re-
eord right nO\V. vVithout waiting five days." 
l\fR. NELSON: ''But what finding does Your Honor 
1nake on the breach of the contract~'' 
THE COlTRT: ''With that statement in the record, the 
court \Yill no\v 1nake a finding to the effect that you 
haven't sho"'rn a substantial breach of the contract, so 
as to entitle you to a rescission, and I make a find a-
gainst you in view of that statement.'' 
MR. NELSON: ''In other words you're holding there 
\Vas no breach of the contract.'' 
THE COURT: "No breach of the coptract. They hav-
ing consented that the Chancellor may insert these 
equitable provisions in the findings. If they hadn't con-
sented I would have jumped the o~her way." 
The Court had announced that he had, in fact de-
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eided that thE:Are "'"as a breach of the contract but thi~ 
"~as nullified and changed to a decision of '~no breach'' 
by the pron1pt consent of defendants' counsel to accept 
of the court's proposition. 
In the foregoing decision there is manifested a total 
lack of concern for the welfare of an aged and infirm 
person. The court seemed to be concernd only for the 
unjust enrichment of the defendants. Conceding, as the 
court did, that there was sufficient evidence to prove 
a breach, yet, in order to promote the welfare of the 
defendants the court permitted them to dictate the ter111H 
of the judgment by merely filing the so-called consent. 
The judgment also unjustly penalizes an aged and 
infirm person, although the general rule requires the 
eourts to zealously safeguard their interests to the end 
that they may not be victimized by the unscrupulous. 
1\fr. Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinio_n in the Ward 
case, 85 P. 2d. 635, refers to the trial court's memoran-
dum opinion wherein it is stated ''that it would be 
extremely inequitable to compel the plaintiff to carry 
on the relationship as it has heretofore existed, merely 
for the sak/e of affording to her son an option for the 
purchasing of the property at her death.'' The foregoing 
rule should have been invoked by the trial court in the 
case at bar. 
Point 4 
On or about May 25, 1950, plaintiff commenced an 
action to cancel and set aside the purported written 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
52 
assign1nent of the note and mortgage (Defendants ex-
hibit 3), in the District Court of Power County, Idaho, 
'vhere the land described in said mortgage is situated .. 
rrne SUll1lllOnS was duly and regularly issued by the 
Idaho Court and was served upon the defendants in 
(~ache County, Utah, on June 12, 1950, on vv-hich date 
trial was commenced in the case at bar. When the trial 
\\v~u~ resumed on June 21, 1950, (Tr. 157), the defendants 
1noved the court for permission to file an amended an-
~\\' e r to interplead the transaction involved in the Idaho 
action, in the instant case. This motion was resisted by 
plaintiff, because the District Court of Power County, 
Idaho, had acquired jurisdiction of the defendants by 
~ervice of summons upon them, which they did not 
question; ( Tr. 159) and the property described in the 
n1ortgage refered to in the written assignment, (Defend-
ant's exhibit 3) is located in Power County, Idaho, 
( Tr. 158). Nevertheless, the trial court permitted the 
defendants to file said amended answer (Tr. 161) and 
later admitted evidence relating to said transaction over 
plaintiff's objection. (Tr. 254) 
Plain tiff also moved to strike the pleading denom-
inated consent, (Tr. 40, 41) and also the Findings of Fact 
numbers 6, 7, 11, and 13, and its Conclusions of Law and 
Decree, and as much thereof as pertained to the assign-
Inent of the note and mortgage in question. (Tr. 4?, 43, 
44) 
Plaintiff's action in the State of Idaho, is brought 
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to cancel and set aside the purported assignment of said 
note and mortgage and to remove the cloud from the 
title to said property, cast thereon by the filing of said 
purported assignment, in the office of the County Re-
corder of Power County, Idaho. 
While defendants' aforesaid motion to interplead 
was under discussion the court announced upon two 
occasions that if plaintiff's action in Idaho was brought 
to remove a cloud from the title, the court didn't-
' • propose to make findings of fact in a suit to quiet title 
in Idaho," (Tr. 161) and the court further stated, "As 
I said before, if you've got a suit to ren1ove a cloud up 
there, this case will not interfere with that proceeding.'' 
(Tr. 163, 164) 
When the trial court conceded that it would not in-
terfere with the Idaho suit, if it was an action to re-
move a cloud, which it is, plainti~f's counsel was led to 
believe that the court would finally eliminate any issue 
involved in that case from the judgment in the instant 
case. 
The court also entirely ignored the fact that the 
Idaho court had acquired jurdisdiction of the defend-
ants. And before the court had entered its judgment in 
the instant case, it was informed that the defendants 
had made a general appearance in the Idaho case. (Tr. 
509) 
Plaintiff did not join issue on any of the issues in-
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volved in the Idaho action. And the Court expressed 
doubt- ''whether the pleadings will support findings 
on the Idaho property.'' (Tr. 506) 
[t is respectfully submitted that this action was 
vroperly instituted in the State of Idaho, where the 
property effected is situated under the following rule 
~tated in 12 C. J. 478 
''The rule supported by the weight of author-
ity in the United States, however, appears to be 
that executory contracts relating to real prop-
erty are governed as to their requisites, validity, 
and effect by the law of the place where the 
realty is located." 
The same rule is applied by the Supreme Court of 
Idaho, in Knudsen v. Lythman, 200 Pac. 130: 
"Appellant has also sought to avoid the 
consequences of the rule by the fact that this 
1nortgage was executed in the state of Washing-
ton. This contention is wholly without merit, for it 
is settled law that every instrument affecting the 
title to real property is subject exclusively to the 
laws of the state or government within whose 
jurisdiction the real property is situated. Han-
nah v. Vensel, 19 Idaho, 796, 16 Pac. 115. 
The appellant respectfully submits to this Honor-
able Court that the findings, conclusions and judgment 
of the trial court be reversed, remanding the case and 
directing that the trial court enter findings, conclusions 
and decree, canceling the deed and bill of sale; and to 
enter such judgment with respect to the other causes 
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of action as equity and justice het"~P~n the parties will 
dictate, and to eliminate the i~snPs involved in the Idaho 
case. 
Respectfully subnz it ted, 
' 
L. E. NELSON 
.... \ttorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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